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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
JOSEPH R. FREDRICKSON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20070432-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
& r^ & 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendant was convicted of one count of production of a controlled substance 
(psilocin), a first degree felony, one count of production of a controlled substance 
(marijuana), a second degree felony, two counts of endangerment of a child, third degree 
felonies, and one count of possessing drug paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor. R. 
145: 175-76. On June 19, 2007, the supreme court transferred this case to this Court. R. 
147. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (West 
2004). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL & STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: Did defendant's trial counsel render ineffective assistance of counsel by 
not requesting a directed verdict at the close of the State's case, where officers had 
testified that they found a fully functioning drug lab in defendant's apartment? 
Standard of Review: "An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the 
first time on appeal presents a question of law." State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, ^ f 6, 89 P.3d 
162. 
Issue 2: Was the evidence sufficient to support defendant's convictions, where 
officers had testified that they found a fully functioning drug lab in defendant's 
apartment? 
Standard of Review: Defendant did not raise this issue below, so review is for 
plain error. State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, j^ 17, 10 P.3d 346. To establish plain error on 
a sufficiency claim, a defendant must first demonstrate that, "after viewing the evidence 
and all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the 
evidence 'is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable such that reasonable 
minds must have entertained reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime for 
which he or she was convicted." Id. at \ 18 (citation omitted). If this Court concludes 
that the evidence was insufficient, the Court "must then . . . determine whether the 
evidentiary defect was so obvious and fundamental that it was plain error to submit the 
case to the jury." Id. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(l)(a) (West 2004): 
Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to knowingly 
and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to produce, 
manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance . . . . 
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Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-112.5(a) (West 2004): 
Any person who knowingly or intentionally causes or permits a child or elder 
adult to be exposed to, to ingest or inhale, or to have contact with a controlled 
substance, chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia as defined in Subsection (1), 
is guilty of a felony of the third degree. 
Utah Code Annotated § 58-37a-5(l) (West 2004): 
It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug 
paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, 
compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, 
contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled 
substance into the human body in violation of this chapter. 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 17: 
At the conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution, or at the conclusion of all the 
evidence, the court may issue an order dismissing any information or indictment, 
or any count thereof, upon the ground that the evidence is not legally sufficient to 
establish the offense charged therein or any lesser included offense. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with: one count of production of a controlled substance 
(psilocin), in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(l)(a)(i) (West 2004); one 
count of production of a controlled substance (marijuana), in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated § 58-37-8(l)(a)(i) (West 2004); two counts of endangerment of a child, in 
violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-112.5(a) (West 2004); and one count of 
possessing drug paraphernalia, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37a-5(l) (West 
2004). R. 8-10. Ajury convicted defendant on all counts. R. 145: 175-76. Defendant 
timely appealed. R. 131. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
On May 25, 2006, defendant's landlord was climbing a ladder to the roof to 
perform maintenance when he looked through a window and saw marijuana growing in 
defendant's spare bedroom. R. 144:74. Defendant's landlord also observed lights 
hanging above the marijuana plants, as well as something that "looked like tinfoil 
hanging . . . on the walls and from the ceiling." R. 144: 75. 
After descending from the roof, the landlord contacted police. R. 144: 76. 
Officers had already received reports of illegal activity in defendant's apartment, and 
noted that the landlord had given an accurate description of what a marijuana-growing 
operation would look like. R. 144: 113. Officers accordingly obtained a warrant to 
search defendant's apartment. R. 144: 113-14. 
Officers executed the search warrant the following afternoon. R. 144: 118. In 
preparation, Sergeant Dave Murphy of the Box Elder County Sheriffs office set up pre-
operational surveillance on defendant's apartment. R. 144: 178. Approximately thirty 
minutes before the search team entered, Sergeant Murphy saw a black sedan leave the 
apartment complex. R. 144: 179. Defendant's landlord had also been watching 
defendant's apartment throughout that day. He saw defendant in his apartment that 
morning and "probably through lunch." R. 144: 84. Shortly before 2 p.m., he saw 
defendant, his wife, and their two children pull away in their "black car." R. 144: 85. 
1
 The following facts are recited "in a light most favorable to [the jury's] verdict." 
State v. Gordon, 913 P.2d 350, 351 (Utah 1996). Because defendant's primary challenge 
is to his counsel's failure to request a directed verdict after the State rested, these facts 
are limited to those introduced during the State's case-in-chief. 
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Between 10 to 20 minutes later, R. 144: 84, 179, officers began searching 
defendant's apartment. R. 144: 119-21. After entering, officers noticed an 
"overwhelming" smell of "fresh marijuana." R. 144: 132, 170; 145:31. The smell was 
so strong that officers began to get sick and had to periodically leave the apartment for 
fresh air. R. 144: 132. 
When officers opened the door to defendant's spare bedroom, "all [they] saw was 
[a] tarp from ceiling to ground." R. 144: 134. The tarp was "cut around fixtures," and 
"taped and pinned up" in a manner that was "tailored to this room." R. 144: 174. The 
tarp was "stretched taut" at the doorway, effectively creating a "hallway" between the 
tarp and the wall. R. 144: 134. The makeshift hallway ran down the first wall, around a 
corner, and down the adjoining wall. R. 144: 134. At that point, "there was a slot cut in 
the tarp that had the edges taped up." R. 144: 135. After passing through that slot, 
officers entered a "room built inside of a room." R. 144: 167. The officers found this 
significant because tarps are commonly used in clandestine drug labs to contain heat, 
thereby facilitating growth of illegal drugs. R. 144: 169. 
Once inside the tarped-off room, officers found marijuana plants growing in six 
different pots. R. 144: 135-36. The plants were approximately 24 inches in height, and 
were growing under a series of lamps that were connected to timers. R. 144: 135-36. In 
addition, officers found a bag of marijuana leaves hanging from a bedroom wall in an 
adjoining room, a fully grown marijuana plant in defendant's garbage can outside, and a 
marijuana plant growing through the cracks in the sidewalk "just outside" defendant's 
apartment. R. 144: 132-34, 137. Officers also found a metal safe inside defendant's hall 
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closet. Inside the safe, officers found handwritten notes describing the marijuana laws 
from different states, as well as a stack of magazines regarding marijuana use and 
cultivation. R. 144: 130. The magazines had titles such as "Weed World" and "High 
Times." R. 144: 130. 
Officers also found evidence that defendant was growing hallucinogenic 
mushrooms (psilocin) in the spare bedroom. They found 24 jars in that room containing 
mushroom spores and vermiculite, a substance commonly used when growing 
mushrooms, as well as a food dehydrator with mushroom remnants still inside. R. 144: 
124-28, 137. In the laundry room, officers found a bag of vermiculite and a pressure 
cooker with mushroom spores inside. R. 144: 127. 
One of the narcotics officers later testified that, even with his training in narcotics 
operations, it would have taken him "a couple [of] days to set" up the taip, plants, and 
other assorted evidence. R. 144: 174. 
Defendant had two minor children living in his home, so a DCFS caseworker had 
accompanied the search team to the apartment. R. 145: 29. When defendant was arrested 
later that afternoon while driving on a local road, the DCFS caseworker was sent to the 
scene. R. 145: 31-32. As the DCFS worker approached defendant's children, she noticed 
a "pungent marijuana smell" on them. R. 145: 32. According to the caseworker, the 
children "smelled like the home." R. 145: 32. 
Officers later tested the plants found in defendant's spare bedroom and confirmed 
that they were, in fact, marijuana. R. 144: 195-97. Officers also submitted three different 
mushroom samples for testing. Though the first two samples tested negative, the third 
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sample, taken from the food dehydrator found in the spare bedroom, tested positive as 
psilocin, a controlled hallucinogenic. R. 145: 9, 16-17.2 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his trial 
counsel did not move for a directed verdict at the close of the State's case. Though 
defendant did not raise the issue below, he also claims that his convictions were not 
supported by the evidence. Defendant's arguments should be rejected for two reasons. 
First, defendant has inadequately briefed the issues. Defendant has not only failed 
to marshal the supportive evidence, but he has also failed to explain which convictions 
and which elements are actually subject to his evidentiary challenges. Without such 
specificity, this Court is left to guess at the precise nature of defendant's claims. This is 
inadequate briefing, and this Court should reject defendant's claims on this basis. 
Second, defendant's claims should also be rejected on their merits. When police 
officers entered defendant's apartment 10 to 20 minutes after defendant left, they found 
marijuana, hallucinogenic mushrooms, and an elaborate clandestine drug lab. Given this 
evidence, a motion for a directed verdict would have been futile, and defendant's 
convictions were supported by more than sufficient evidence. 
2
 The two negative tests were likely due to the officers' inexperience in dealing 
with mushrooms. The lead officer testified that "[t]his is the first suspected mushroom 
grow we've ever had," and stated that the team "didn't honestly know how to preserve 
[mushrooms] to be tested." R. 144: 159. The evidence custodian who placed the 
mushrooms in containers for storage, for example, was unaware that mushrooms need to 
be ventilated to prevent rot. R. 144: 186. When the first two samples were subsequently 
opened for testing, they had already become moldy. R. 145: 7. The third sample came 
from the food dehydrator and was already in a dried form at the time of collection and 
storage. R. 144: 159. That third sample tested positive. R. 145:9, 16-17. 
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ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS ARE BOTH INADEQUATELY BRIEFED 
AND MERITLESS 
Defendant argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his trial 
counsel failed to move for a directed verdict at the close of the State's case. Aplt. Br. 10-
15. Defendant also argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions. 
Aplt. Br. 15-19. Defendant's arguments should be rejected for two reasons. First, 
defendant has inadequately briefed his claims. Second, there was sufficient evidence to 
support the charges, both at the close of the State's case-in-chief and at the close of the 
evidence. 
A. Defendant's claims are inadequately briefed. 
Defendant has inadequately briefed his claims by (1) failing to marshal the 
evidence, and (2) failing to specify which charges and elements are subject to his 
evidentiary challenges. 
First, defendant has failed to comply with the marshaling requirement. Under rule 
24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, a party who is "challenging a fact finding 
must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding." This Court's 
"insistence on compliance with the marshaling requirement is not a case of exalting 
hypertechnical adherence to form over substance." State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487, 491 
(Utah App. 1992). Instead, '"[a] reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly 
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defined with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository in which the 
appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research.'" Id. (citation omitted). 
Defendant in this case has not even acknowledged the marshaling requirement 
with respect to his directed verdict claim, let alone complied with it. Aplt. Br. 10-15. As 
such, this Court should reject this claim on this basis alone. 
With respect to his sufficiency claim, defendant openly declines to marshal the 
evidence because, in his view, "even with an extensive marshaling of evidence^] the 
jury's verdict cannot be supported." Aplt. Br. 18. In Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 143 
(Utah App. 1992), the appellant similarly argued that he did not need to comply with the 
marshaling requirement because the evidence supporting the verdict was "so 'light.'" Id. 
at 149 n.2. This Court described that argument as "disingenuous," and then affirmed the 
verdict on the basis of the defendant's failure to marshal. Id. at 149. 
While there may be some circumstances in which marshaling can be excused 
because of a complete lack of factual support for the verdict, see, e.g., Woodward v. 
Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah App. 1991), defendant has not properly briefed such a 
claim here by citing or applying any such authority. In any event, as discussed below in 
Point B, there was overwhelming evidence in this case showing that defendant was 
operating a drug lab in his apartment. Given this, this Court should reject defendant's 
sufficiency challenge based on his failure to comply with the marshaling requirement. 
This requirement applies to appeals from a motion for a directed verdict as well 
as those based on an alleged insufficiency of the evidence. See Water & Energy Systems 
Technology, Inc. v. Keil, 2002 UT 32, ffif 14-15, 48 P.3d 888 (motion for a directed 
verdict); State v. Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, ^ 22, 69 P.3d 1278 (sufficiency of the evidence). 
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Second, defendant has not properly supported or explained his argument. Rule 
24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires a party to support any argument 
"with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." This "rule[ ] 
require[s] not just bald citation to authority but development of that authority and 
reasoned analysis based on that authority." Anderson v. Taylor, 2006 UT 79, \ 25, 149 
P.3d 352 (internal quotation and citations omitted). 
Defendant was convicted of five separate crimes: one count of producing psilocin, 
one count of producing marijuana, two counts of child endangerment, and one count of 
possessing drug paraphernalia. R. 8-10, 145: 175-76. These crimes involve three 
different sets of elements, which the jury then applied to five different sets of probative 
facts.4 
In his brief, defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient, both at the close 
of the State's case and again at the close of trial. Aplt. Br. 10-19. Defendant does not 
specifically address a particular charge, however, let alone identify a specific element 
from a specific charge for which he believes the evidence was lacking. Without such 
specificity, a proper response to defendant's claim requires guesswork. Specifically, 
though defendant generally claims that there was no evidence that there was a drug lab in 
his apartment, he does not explain whether this challenge applies only to the two 
production charges, or whether it is instead intended to reach the endangerment and 
4
 The two production counts share the same operative elements, as do the two 
child endangerment counts. 
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paraphernalia charges as well. Defendant also fails to identify which elements from 
which of these charges are or are not actually at issue in this appeal. 
This Court is not "simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the 
burden of argument." State v. Barrett, 2006 UT App 417, *{ 16 n.7, 147 P.3d 491 
(internal quotations and citation omitted). At a bare minimum, a defendant who raises a 
sufficiency challenge should be required to identify the charges and elements that he 
thinks were insufficiently supported. Defendant in this case has done neither. As such, 
this Court should reject his claim as inadequately briefed. 
B. Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel, and his 
convictions were supported by sufficient evidence. 
Defendant claims that his counsel was ineffective for failing to request a directed 
verdict at the close of the State's case, and then claims that the convictions were not 
supported by sufficient evidence. Aplt. Br. 10-19. Defendant's arguments should be 
rejected.5 
5
 In his Argument heading, defendant suggests that he was denied effective 
assistance of counsel as guaranteed by both the federal and state constitutions. Aplt. Br. 
10. In the text of his brief, however, defendant only cites to authority that is based on the 
United States Supreme Court's decision in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984). Aplt. Br. 10-15. Defendant does not cite to any authority that is specific to the 
state constitution, nor does he advance a separate state constitutional argument based on 
the specific text of the state constitution, state constitutional history, or state-specific 
policy considerations. 
While there is no "formula . . . for adequate framing and briefing of state 
constitutional issues," the "mere mention of state provisions will not suffice." State v. 
Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, \ 37, 162 P.3d 1106. "[C]ursory references to the state 
constitution within arguments otherwise dedicated to a federal constitutional claim are 
inadequate. When parties fail to direct their argument to the state constitutional issue, our 
ability to formulate an independent body of state constitutional law is compromised. 
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To support an ineffectiveness claim, a defendant must show: "first, that his 
counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, which 
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional! judgment and, 
second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant." State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 
41, U 25, 1 P.3d 546 (internal quotations and citations omitted). To show prejudice, a 
defendant must establish "a reasonable probability . . . that except for ineffective counsel, 
the result would have been different." State v. Verde, 110 P.2d 116, 118 (Utah 1989). 
Defendant claims that his counsel performed deficiently by failing to follow the 
"general practice of defense counsel in criminal trials . . . to move for a directed verdict 
or motion to dismiss after the state has rested." Aplt. Br. 13. Defendant's conclusory 
assertion regarding the supposed "general practice" is unsupported by any reference to 
any authority, and should be rejected on this basis alone. See State v. Gomez, 2002 UT 
120, *| 29, 63 P.3d 72 (holding that arguments are inadequately briefed when they are 
based solely on "conclusory statements"); State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, % 31, 973 P.2d 404 
(same). 
In any event, defendant is incorrect in suggesting that defense attorneys have a, per 
se obligation to move for directed verdicts at the close of the prosecution's case. Instead, 
the Utah Supreme Court has specifically held that a defense attorney does not have an 
Inadequate briefing denies our fledgling state constitutional analysis the full benefit of the 
interested parties' thoughts on these important issues." State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, 
164 P.3d 397 \ 18, 164 P.3d 397. Thus, though defendant's "brief refers to both the state 
and federal constitutional provisions," his brief "offers no basis for independent reliance 
on the state constitution. Therefore, [this court should] address only the federal 
provision." State v. Jensen, 818 P.2d 551, 552 n. 2 (Utah 1991). 
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obligation "to raise futile objections" or motions. Kelley, 2000 UT 41, f^ 26. Given this, 
regardless of what the "general practice" is, a defense attorney simply does not have an 
obligation to move for a directed verdict unless the motion is actually warranted under 
the particular facts of that case. It is thus significant that this Court has repeatedly 
affirmed convictions in which defense counsel declined to raise such motions. See, e.g., 
State v. Gill, 2007 UT App 227U, *2; State v. Kaaloa, 2007 UT App 501U, *2; State v. 
Garcia, 2006 UT App 235U, * 1; State v. Kinne, 2006 UT App 156U, *2; State v. 
Atencio, 2005 UT App 417U, *1. 
If defendant's counsel had moved for a directed verdict, it would have been 
rejected. A trial court only grants a motion for a directed verdict if the prosecution 
presented no evidence from which a "reasonable jury could find that the elements of the 
crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5, \ 29, 
84 P.3d 1183. In evaluating such a motion, the trial court does not "weigh the evidence," 
but instead views the evidence "in the light most favorable to the [S]tate." Id. at fflf 29, 
32 (internal quotations and citations omitted). If there was "any evidence, however, 
slight or circumstantial, which tend[ed] to show guilt of the crime charged or any of its 
degrees," the court has the "duty" to deny the motion and "submit the case to the jury." 
Id. at Tf 33 (internal quotations and citation omitted); accord State v. Robertson, 2005 UT 
App 419, f 14, 122 P.3d 895. 
Officers entered defendant's apartment 10 to 20 minutes after defendant and his 
family had left. R. 144: 84, 179. Upon entry, officers were beset by an "overwhelming" 
smell of "fresh marijuana." R. 144: 132, 170; 145: 31. They found an elaborately 
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constructed "room within a room" inside defendant's spare bedroom, R. 144: 167, in 
which there were marijuana plants growing in six different pots, heat lamps hanging over 
the plants, 24 jars containing both mushroom spores and vermiculite, and a food 
dehydrator containing psilocin mushroom spores. R. 144: 124-28, 135-36; 145: 9, 16-17. 
In addition, officers found a bag of marijuana leaves hanging from a bedroom wall in an 
adjoining room, a fully grown marijuana plant in defendant's garbage can outside, a 
marijuana plant growing through the cracks in the sidewalk "just outside" defendant's 
apartment, and a safe containing notes and magazines relating to the production of 
marijuana. R. 144: 130, 132-34, 137. Finally, when defendant was arrested a short time 
later, his two minor children, who lived with him and were with him at the time of the 
arrest, "smelled like the home" and reeked of marijuana. R. 145: 32. 
Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, this evidence amd its reasonable 
inferences fully supported the State's claim that defendant was producing marijuana and 
psilocin mushrooms within his apartment. Had defendant's counsel moved for a directed 
verdict at the close of the State's case, the court therefore would have had the "duty" to 
deny it and submit the case to the jury. Montoya, 2004 UT 5, f^ 33. Defendant did not 
receive ineffective assistance of counsel, nor was he prejudiced by his counsel's failure to 
file a futile motion at the close of the State's case. 
Contrary to defendant's claim, this Court's decision in State v. Smith, 2003 UT 
App 52, 65 P.3d 648, overruled by 2005 UT 57, 122 P.3d 615, does not support his claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel. Aplt. Br. 12-13. In Smith, this Court held that a 
defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to request a 
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directed verdict at the close of the State's case. 2003 UT App 52, ffif 34-35. This Court 
based its holding on the fact that the prosecutor had "presented no evidence" regarding 
one of the elements of the crime. Id. at f^ 32.6 
Defendant has not even identified the charge at issue in this case, let alone the 
particular element for which he claims there was no supporting evidence. Regardless, the 
State presented ample evidence to support its claim that defendant was producing drugs 
in his apartment. Specifically, the State presented testimony from officers who found 
marijuana and psilocin spores in his apartment, as well as evidence of elaborate 
production facilities that had been constructed in defendant's spare bedroom. R. 144: 
124-28, 135-36. Smith is therefore inapposite to this case. 
Defendant next claims that the convictions were insufficiently supported by the 
evidence. Aplt. Br. 15-19. Defendant acknowledges that he did not raise the issue 
below, but nevertheless contends that reversal is appropriate as plain error. Aplt. Br. 15. 
To establish plain error on a sufficiency claim, a defendant must first demonstrate that, 
"after viewing the evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable 
to the jury's verdict, the evidence 'is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable 
such that reasonable minds must have entertained reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime for which he or she was convicted." Id. at f^ 18 (citation omitted). 
If this Court concludes that the evidence was insufficient, the Court "must then . . . 
determine whether the evidentiary defect was so obvious and fundamental that it was 
6
 On certiorari, the supreme court concluded that the element in question was not 
actually an element of the offense, and therefore vacated this Court's decision on that 
basis. 2005 UT 57, inf 16-22. 
15 
plain error to submit the case to the jury.'" Id. In making this determination, the 
"presentation of conflicting evidence does not preclude a finding of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt." State v. Smith, 927 P.2d 649, 652 (Utah App. 1996). 
As set forth above, there was more than sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror 
to conclude that defendant was producing drugs within his apartment. Officers found a 
fully functioning drug laboratory inside defendant's apartment 10 to 20 minutes after he 
left it. R. 144: 84, 124-28, 135-36, 179. Though defendant claimed at trial that his 
landlord had somehow entered the apartment in the interim and planted the evidence, an 
experienced narcotics officer testified that it would have taken "a couple [of] days to set" 
up the elaborate drug laboratory. R. 144: 124-28, 135-36, 174. Given this, the jury was 
entitled to draw the reasonable inference that defendant was responsible for those drugs. 
In response, defendant argues that the supreme court's decision in State v. 
Shumway, 2002 UT 124, 63 P.3d 94, is controlling. Aplt. Br. 17-18. In Shumway, the 
supreme court held that there was insufficient evidence to convict the defendant of 
destroying a knife that he had allegedly used in a murder. 2002 UT 124, ^ j 15-18. The 
supreme court stressed that the knife had not ever been found, and that the State had 
produced no evidence either tying the defendant to the non-existent knife or somehow 
showing that he had done anything to it. Id. As such, the court concluded that the 
evidence was too "remote [and] speculative" to support the conviction. Id. at f^ 18 
(internal quotations and citation omitted). 
By contrast, the evidence in this case was neither remote nor speculative. Officers 
found an elaborate, clandestine drug laboratory in defendant's apartment 10 to 20 
16 
minutes after he was seen leaving it, and officers later testified that the laboratory would 
have taken days to set up. R. 144: 124-28, 135-36, 174. In addition, when defendant was 
pulled over later that afternoon, his children reeked of marijuana. R. 145: 32. Thus, 
unlike Shurnway, there was no "speculative gap" in this case at all. Rather, the evidence 
overwhelmingly supported the jury's conclusion that defendant was responsible for the 
drugs and the clandestine laboratory that was found in his apartment. The convictions 
should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the convictions below. 
Respectfully submitted October 2£, 2007. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
O . i 
RYAg/D. TENNEY 
Assistant Attorney General 
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